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This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey (1927) and 
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971)) to a competitive economy in which some markets are inefficient 
due to asymmetric information. As in most insurance markets, consumers impose varying 
costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs to customers and consequently all are 
charged equal prices. In a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to 
average marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey-
Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that they include 
general-equilibrium effects which reflect the initial deviations of producer prices from 
marginal costs, and the response of equilibrium prices to the taxes levied. It is shown that 
condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the deviations from the 
standard formula. The general analysis is applied to the optimum taxation of annuities and life 
insurance. 
JEL Code: D43, H21. 
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August, 2006 1 Introduction
The setting for the standard theory of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey
(1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Salanie (2003)) is a competitive equilibrium
which attains an e¢ cient resource allocation. In the absence of lump-sum taxes,
the government wishes to raise revenue by means of distortive commodity taxes
and the theory develops the conditions that have to hold for these taxes to min-
imize the deadweight loss (the ￿ Ramsey-Boiteux Conditions￿). The analysis was
extended in some directions to allow for an initial ine¢ cient allocation of resources.
In such circumstances, aside from the need to raise revenue, taxes/subsidies may
serve as means to improve welfare due to market ine¢ ciencies. The rules for op-
timum commodity taxation, therefore, mix considerations of shifting an ine¢ cient
market equilibrium in a welfare enhancing direction and the distortive e⁄ects of
gaps between consumer and producer marginal valuations generated by commodity
taxes.
Two major extensions of the standard model have been explored. First, the
inclusion of externalities and the need to ￿nance public goods (Sandmo (1975),
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Lau, Sheshinski and Stiglitz (1978)). While speci￿c
assumptions about the form of externalities (e.g. ￿ atmosphere externalities￿ ) or
about the form of preferences for public goods (e.g. weak separability), as well as
the absence of distributional considerations, were needed to obtain sharper results,
these contributions are quite general and the results are robust. The second exten-
sion is to allow for imperfect competition (Auerbach and Hines (2001), Guesnerie
and La⁄ont (1978), Myles (1987, 1989)). Here, the results seem to depend more
crucially on particular assumptions about the de￿nition of the imperfectly com-
petitive equilibrium (monopoly, Cournot, Bertrand or strategic, repeated game-
theoretic, equilibria), about the number of ￿rms in oligopoly markets, about the
type of taxes (speci￿c or ad-valoren) and about the presence or absence of uncer-
tainty (making the availability or unavailability of insurance critical). Although
these papers provide valuable insights about taxation in speci￿c circumstances, no
broad rules on optimum taxation under imperfect competition seem to emerge.
This paper goes in a di⁄erent direction. Markets are assumed to be perfectly
competitive but there is asymmetric information between ￿rms and consumers
2about ￿ relevant￿characteristics which a⁄ect the costs of ￿rms, as well as consumer
preferences. Leading examples are in the ￿eld of insurance. Expected costs of
medical insurance depend on the health characteristics of the insured. Of course,
the value of such insurance to the purchaser depends on the same characteristics.
Similarly, the costs of an annuity depend on the expected payout which depends on
the individual￿ s survival prospects. Naturally, these prospects also a⁄ect the value
of an annuity to the individual￿ s expected lifetime utility. Other examples where
personal characteristics a⁄ect costs are rental contracts (e.g. cars) and ￿xed-fee
contracts for use of certain facilities (clubs).
When ￿rms are able to identify customers￿relevant characteristics (in insur-
ance parlance, ￿ risk class￿ ), competitive pressures equate prices to marginal costs
for each customer type, and the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient. Such identi￿-
cation, however, may not be possible or is imperfect and costly because it requires
monitoring of activities, such as quantities purchased (Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)),
and the collection of information available at a multitude of ￿rms. In these circum-
stances, commodities are sold at the same prices to di⁄erent types of consumers,
mostly to all consumers without distinction. This is called a pooling-equilibrium.
Zero pro￿ts in a competitive pooling equilibrium imply that the price of each good
is equal to average marginal costs weighted by the equilibrium quantities purchased
by all consumers.
This paper analyses the conditions for optimum commodity taxes in the pres-
ence of pooling markets. The modeling of preferences and of costs is general,
allowing for any ￿nite number of markets. We focus, though, only on e¢ ciency
aspects, disregarding distributional (￿ equity￿ ) considerations1. We obtain surpris-
ingly simple modi￿ed Ramsey-Boiteux conditions and explain the deviations from
the standard model. Broadly, the additional terms that emerge re￿ ect the fact
that the initial producer price of each commodity deviates from each consumer￿ s
marginal costs, being equal to these costs only on average. Each levied speci￿c tax
a⁄ects all prices (termed, a ￿ general-equilibrium e⁄ect￿), and, consequently, a small
increase in a tax level a⁄ects the quantity-weighted gap between producer prices
1We have a good idea how exogenous income heterogeneity can be incorporated in the analysis
(e.g. Salanie (2003)).
3and individual marginal costs, the direction depending on the relation between
demand elasticities and costs.
After developing general formulas (Section 3), we analyze (Section 4) an ex-
ample of a three-good economy with pooling equilibrium in the annuitiy market.
2 Equilibrium With Asymmetric Information
Individuals consume n goods, Xi; i = 1;2;::;n and a numeraire, Y: There are




h; ￿) + y
h; h = 1;2;::;H (1)




i is the quantity of good i and yh is the quantity
of the numeraire consumed by individual h. The utility function, uh; is assumed
to be strictly concave and di⁄erentiable in xh. Linear separability is assumed to
eliminate distributional considerations, focusing on the e¢ ciency aspects of opti-
mum taxation. It is well-known how to incorporate equity issues in the analysis of
commodity taxation (e.g. Salanie (2003)).
The parameter ￿ is a personal attribute which is singled out because it has
cost e⁄ects. Speci￿cally, it is assumed that the unit costs of good i consumed by
individuals with a given ￿ (￿ type ￿￿ ) is ci(￿): Leading examples are health and
longevity insurance. The health status of an individual a⁄ects both his consump-
tion preferences and the costs to the medical insurance provider. Similarly, the
payout of annuities (e.g. retirement bene￿ts) is contingent on survival and hence
depends on the individual￿ s relevant mortality function. Other examples are car
rentals and car insurance, whose costs and value to consumers depend on driving
patterns and other personal characteristics2.
It is assumed that ￿ is continuously distributed in the population, with a
distribution function, F(￿), over a ￿nite interval, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿:
The economy has given total resources, R > 0. With unit costs of 1 for the
2Representation of these characteristics by a single parameter is, of course, a simpli￿cation.
4numeraire, Y , the aggregate resource constraint is written
￿ ￿ Z
￿
[c(￿)x(￿) + y(￿)]dF(￿) = R (2)
where c(￿) = (c1(￿);c2(￿);::;cn(￿)); x(￿) = (x1(￿);x2(￿);::;xn(￿)); xi(￿) being























s.t. the resource constraint (2). The F.O.C. for an interior solution equates mar-























i (￿): Individuals￿optimum level of the nu-
meraire Y (and hence utility levels) is indeterminate, but the total amount, y￿, is




The First-Best allocation can be supported by competitive markets with indi-
vidualized prices equal to marginal costs3. That is, if pi is the price of good i, then
e¢ ciency is attained when all type ￿ individuals face the same price pi(￿) = ci(￿):
When ￿ is private information unknown to suppliers (and not veri￿able by
monitoring individuals￿purchases), then for each good ￿rms will charge the same
price to all individuals. This is called a (Second-Best) Pooling Equilibrium.
3The only constraint on the allocation of incomes, mh(￿), is that they support an interior
solution. The modi￿cations required to allow for zero equilibrium quantities are well-known and
immaterial for the following.
5Pooling Equilibrium
Good Xi is o⁄ered at a price pi to all individuals, i = 1;2;::;n: The competitive





h; h = 1;2;::;H (5)
where mh = mh(￿) is the (given) income of the h-th type ￿ individual. It assumed




h;￿) ￿ pi = 0; i = 1;2;::;n h = 1;2;::;H (6)







; and the corresponding type ￿ total demands ^ x(p;￿) =
H P
h=1
^ xh(p;￿): The optimum levels of Y , ^ yh, are obtained from the budget constraints
(5): ^ yh(p;￿) = mh(￿) ￿ p^ x










Let ￿i(p) be total pro￿ts in the production of good i:




where ^ xi(p) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
^ xi(p;￿)dF(￿) is the aggregate demand for good i.
De￿nition 1 4 A pooling-equilibrium is a vector of prices, ^ p, which satis￿es ￿i(^ p) =








; i = 1;2;::;n: (8)
4For general analyses of pooling equilibria see, for example, La⁄ont and Martimort (2002) and
Salanie (1997).
6Equilibrium prices are weighted averages of marginal costs, the weights being
the equilibrium quantities purchased by the di⁄erent ￿ types. Writing (7) (or (8))
in matrix form:
￿(^ p) = ^ pX(^ p)￿
￿ ￿ Z
￿
c(￿) ^ X(^ p;￿)dF(￿) = 0 (9)
where ￿(^ p) = (￿1(^ p);￿2(^ p);::;￿n(^ p));
(10)
^ X(^ p) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
X(^ p;￿)dF(￿); c(￿) = (c1(￿);c2(￿);::; cn(￿)); and 0 is 1 ￿ n zero
vector 0 = (0;0;::;0): Let ^ K(^ p) be the n ￿ n matrix with elements ^ kij;
^ kij(^ p) =
￿ ￿ Z
￿
(^ pi ￿ ci(￿))sij(^ p;￿)dF(￿); i:j = 1;2;::;n (11)
where sij(^ p;￿) =
@^ xi(^ p;￿)
@pj
are the substitution terms.
We can now state:
Proposition 1. When ^ X(p) + ^ K(p) is positive-de￿nite for any p, then
there exist unique and globally stable prices, ^ p, which satisfy (9).
Proof. Appendix A.
We shall assume throughout that the condition in Proposition 1 is satis￿ed.
Note that when costs are independent of ￿, ^ pi ￿ ci = 0; i = 1;2;::;n; ^ K = 0 and
this condition is trivially satis￿ed.
3 Optimum Commodity Taxation
Suppose that the government wishes to impose speci￿c commodity taxes on Xi;
i = 1;2;::;n: Let the unit tax (subsidy) on Xi be ti so that its (tax inclusive)
7consumer price is qi = pi + ti, i = 1;2;::;n: Consumer demands, ^ xh
i (q;￿); are
now functions of these prices, q = p + t; t = (t1;t2;::;tn): Correspondingly, total














i = 1;2;::;n (12)
or, in matrix form,
￿(^ q) = ^ q^ X(^ q) ￿
￿ ￿ Z
￿
(c(￿) + t)^ X(^ q;￿)dF(￿) = 0 (13)
where ^ X(^ q;￿) and X(^ q) are the diagonal n ￿ n matrices de￿ned above, with ^ q
replacing ^ p:
Note that each element in ^ K(^ q); kij(^ q) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
(^ pi ￿ ci(￿))sij(^ q;￿)dF(￿); also
depends on ^ pi or ^ qi ￿ti: It is assumed that ^ X(q)+ ^ K(q) is positive de￿nite for all
q. Hence, given t, there exist unique prices, ^ q (and the corresponding ^ p = ^ q ￿ t),
which satisfy (13).
Observe that each equilibrium price, ^ qi, depends on the whole vector of tax
rates, t. Speci￿cally, di⁄erentiating (13) w.r.t. the tax rates, we obtain:
( ^ X(^ q) + ^ K(^ q)) ^ Q = ^ X(^ q) (14)
where ^ Q is the n ￿ n matrix whose elements are
@^ qi
@tj
; i;j = 1;2;::;n:
All principal minors of ^ X + ^ K are positive and it has a well-de￿ned inverse.
Hence, from (14),
^ Q = ( ^ X + ^ K)
￿1 ^ X: (15)
It is seen from (15) that equilibrium consumer prices rise w.r.t. an increase
in own tax rates:
@^ qi
@ti
= ^ xi(^ q)
￿ ￿ ￿ ^ X + ^ K
￿ ￿ ￿




￿ ￿ ￿ ^ X + ^ K
￿ ￿ ￿ is the determinant of ^ X + ^ K; and
￿ ￿ ￿ ^ X + ^ K
￿ ￿ ￿
ii
is the principal minor
obtained by deleting the i-th row and the i-th column. In general, the sign of cross-
price e⁄ects due to tax rate increases is indeterminate, depending on substitution
and complementarity terms.







i 6= j; when costs in all markets are independent of customer type (no asymmetric
information), that is, the initial equilibrium is e¢ cient: pi ￿ ci = 0; i = 1;2;::;n:









h(^ q;￿)) ￿ c(￿)^ x(^ q;￿)
#
dF(￿) + R (17)
The problem of optimum commodity taxation can now be stated: the govern-
ment wishes to raise a given amount, T, of tax revenue:
t^ x(^ q) = T (18)
by means of unit taxes t = (t1;t2;::;tn) that maximize W(t):
Maximization of (17) s.t. (18) and (15) yields, after substitution of uh
i ￿qi = 0;
i = 1;2;::;n; h = 1;2;::;H from the individual F.O.C., that optimum tax levels,
denoted ^ t, satisfy:
(1 + ￿)^ t^ S ^ Q + 1 ^ K ^ Q = ￿￿1 ^ X (19)
where ^ S is the n ￿ n aggregate substitution matrix whose elements are sij(^ q) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
sij(^ q;￿)dF(￿); 1 is the 1 ￿ n unit vector, 1 = (1;1;::;1); and ￿ > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier of (18).
Rewrite (19) in the more familiar form:











1 ^ X ￿ 1 ^ K (20)
Equation (20) is our fundamental result. Let￿ s examine these optimality conditions
w.r.t. a particular tax, ti :
n X
j=1
^ tjsji(^ q) = ￿
￿
1 + ￿

































(^ pj ￿ cj)^ xj(^ q;￿)"ji(^ q;￿)dF(￿) (23)
where "ji(^ q;￿) =
^ qisji(^ q;￿)
xj(^ q;￿)
, i;j = 1;2;::;n:
Compared to the standard case, ^ kji = ^ k0
ji = 0; i;j = 1;2;::;n; the modi￿ed








respectively, on the R.H.S. The interpretation of this term is straightforward.
In a pooling equilibrium, prices are a weighted average of marginal costs, the
weights being the equilibrium quantities, (9). Since demands, in general, depend
on all prices, all equilibrium prices are interdependent. It follows that an increase
in the unit tax of any good a⁄ects all equilibrium (producer and consumer) prices.
This general-equilibrium e⁄ect of a speci￿c tax is present also in perfectly com-
petitive economies with non-linear technologies, but these price e⁄ects have no
￿rst-order welfare e⁄ects because of the equality of prices and marginal costs. In
contrast, in a pooling equilibrium, where prices deviate from marginal costs (being
equal to the latter only on average), there is a ￿rst-order welfare implication. The
term ^ kji =
￿ ￿ R
￿
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))sij(^ q;￿)dF(￿) (or the equivalent term ^ k0
ji) is a welfare
loss (< 0) or gain (> 0) equal to the di⁄erence between the producer price and
the marginal costs of type ￿ individuals, positive or negative, times the change in
the quantity of good j due to an increase in the price of good i. As we shall show
below, the sign of ^ kji (or ^ k0
ji) depends on the relation between demand elasticity
and ￿:
As seen from (21) or (22), the signs of
n P
j=1
^ kji; respectively, i = 1;2;::;n deter-
mine the direction that optimum taxes in a pooling equilibrium di⁄er from those
10taxes in an initially e¢ cient equilibrium. We shall now show that the sign of these
terms depends on the relation between demand elasticities and costs.
Proposition 2. ^ k0
ji > 0 (< 0) when "ji increases (decreases) with ￿:
Proof. Appendix B.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that when all elasticities "ji are constant,
then ^ k0
ji = 0; i;j = 1;2;::;n; (20) or (21) become the standard Ramsey-Boiteux
Conditions, solving for the same optimum tax structure.
The intuition for the condition in Proposition 1 is the following: ^ kji < 0
means that pro￿ts of good j fall as qi increases, calling for an increase in the
equilibrium price of good j. This ￿ negative￿e⁄ect due to the pooling equilibrium
leads, by (20), to a smaller tax on good i compared to the standard case. Of course,








4 Example: Taxation of Annuities
Consider individuals who consume three goods: annuities, life insurance and a
numeraire. Each annuity pays $1 to the holder as long as he lives. Each unit of
life insurance pays $1 upon death of the policy owner. There is one representative
individual and for simplicity let expected utility, U, be separable and have no time
preference:
U = u(a)z + v(b) + y (24)
where a is the amount of annuities, z is expected lifetime, b the amount of life
insurance and y the amount of numeraire. Utility of consumption, u, and the
utility from bequests, v, are assumed to be strictly concave. As previously, we
assume that the equilibrium values of all variables are strictly positive.
Individuals are di⁄erentiated by their survival prospects. Let ￿ represent an
individual￿ s ￿ risk-class￿(￿ type ￿￿ ) z = z(￿); z strictly increasing in ￿: ￿ is taken to
be continuously distributed in the population over the interval ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; with





Assume a zero rate of interest. In a full information competitive equilibrium,
the price of an annuity to type ￿ individuals is z(￿) and the prices of life insurance
and of the numeraire are 1. All individuals will purchase the same amount of
annuities and life insurance and, for a given income, optimum utility increases
with life expectancy, z(￿):
Let pa and pb be the prices of annuities and life insurance, respectively, in a
pooling equilibrium. Individuals￿budget constraints are:
paa + pbb + y = m (25)
Maximization of (24) s.t. (25), yields (compensated) demand functions ^ a(pa;pb;￿)









(pb ￿ 1)^ b(pa;pb;￿)dF(￿)
Equilibrium prices, denoted ^ pa and ^ pb; are implicitly determined by ￿a = ￿b =
0: Clearly, ^ pb = 1 (since 1 is the unit cost for all individuals).




and ^ b(pa;pb) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
^ b(pa;pb;￿)dF(￿); respectively. We assume (Appendix A) that:
^ a(pa;pb) + ^ k11 > 0; ^ b(pa;pb) + ^ k22 > 0
and
￿
^ a(pa;pb) + ^ k11
￿￿
^ b(pa;pb) + ^ k22
￿






(pa ￿ z(￿))s1idF(￿); s1i =
@^ a(pa;pb;￿)
@pi





(pb ￿ 1)s2idF(￿); s2i =
@^ b(pa;pb;￿)
@pi
; i = a;b
(28)
As seen in Figure 1 (drawn for the case k12 > 0), the pooling equilibrium
(^ pa; ^ pb = 1) is unique and stable.
Figure 1
Now consider unit taxes, ta and tb; imposed on annuities and life insurance
with consumer prices denoted qa = pa +ta and qb = pb +tb; respectively. Applying
the optimality conditions (21), optimum taxes, (^ ta; ^ tb); satisfy the conditions:
s11^ ta + s21^ tb = ￿￿^ a(^ qa; ^ qb) ￿ k11
s12^ ta + s22^ tb = ￿￿
(29)
where 0 < ￿ < 1; sij(^ qa; ^ qb) =
￿ ￿ R
￿
sij(^ qa; ^ qb;￿)dF(￿); s1i(^ qa; ^ qb;￿) =
@^ a(^ qa; ^ qb;￿)
@qi
;
s2i(^ qa; ^ qb;￿) =
@^ b(^ qa; ^ qb;￿)
@qi
; i = a;b; and ^ k11 =
￿ ￿ R
￿
(^ pa ￿ z(￿))s11(^ qa; ^ qb;￿)dF(￿):
5By concavity and separability, (24), s11 < 0; s22 < 0 and s12;s21 > 0:
13Equations (29) are the modi￿ed Ramsey-Boiteux Conditions for the case of
one pooling-market.
To see in what direction the pooling equilibrium a⁄ects optimum taxes, write















a + "12^ t
0

















are the ratios of optimum taxes to consumer prices.
Solving (30) for the tax rates, using the identities "i0+"i1+"i2 = 0; i = 1;2; where






"11 + "22 + "10 +
^ k11
￿^ a




We know that optimum tax ratios depend on complementarity or substitution
of the taxed goods with the untaxed good, "i0; i = 1;2: The additional term, due
to the pooling equilibrium in the annuity market, is
^ k11
￿^ a
; which may be negative or
positive. Proposition 2 states that ^ k11 < 0 when the elasticity of the demand for
annuities increases with life expectancy, z(￿): Observe that a higher z(￿) increases
the amount of annuities purchased,
@^ a
@￿
> 0: Hence, under this assumption, the
additional term tends to (relatively) reduce the tax on annuities. The opposite
argument applies when ^ k11 > 0:
14Appendix A
An interior pooling equilibrium, ^ p, is de￿ned by the system of equations
￿(^ p) = ^ p^ X(^ p) ￿
￿ ￿ Z
￿
c(￿)^ X(^ p;￿)dF(￿) = 0 (A.1)
where ￿(^ p) = (￿1(^ p);￿2(^ p);::;￿n(^ p)); ^ p = (^ p1; ^ p2;::; ^ pn); ^ X(^ p) is the diagonal
n ￿ n matrix:
(A.2)
while X(p;￿) is the diagonal n ￿ n matrix:
(A.3)
and c(￿) = (c1(￿);c2(￿);::;cn(￿)):
It is well known from general equilibrium theory (Arrow and Hahn (1971))
that a su¢ cient condition for ^ p to be unique is that the n￿n matrix ^ X(^ p)+ ^ K(^ p)
be positive de￿nite, where ^ K(^ p) is the n ￿ n matrix whose elements are ^ kij =
￿ ￿ R
￿




Furthermore, if the price of each good is postulated to change in opposite
direction to the sign of the pro￿ts of this good, then this condition also implies
that price dynamics are globally stable, converging to the unique ^ p.




(^ p1 ￿ c1)s11dF(￿) > 0; leading to a decrease in p1: A simultaneous upward
perturbation of p1 and p2 raises ￿1; and ￿2 the 2 ￿ 2 upper principal minor of ￿
is positive, and so on. Convexity of pro￿t functions is the standard assumption in
general equilibrium theory.
15Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Assume that "ji(^ q;￿) =
^ qisji(q;￿)
^ xj(q;￿)
increases with ￿: Since in equilibrium
￿ ￿ Z
￿
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))^ xj(^ q;￿)dF(￿) = 0 (B.1)
and, by assumption, cj(￿) increases with ￿; ^ pj￿ cj(￿) changes sign once over (￿; ￿ ￿),
say at ~ ￿ :
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))^ xj(^ q;￿) R 0 as ￿ Q ~ ￿ (B.2)
Hence,
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))sji(^ q;￿) <
"ji(^ q; ~ ￿)
^ qi
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))^ xj(^ q;￿) (B.3)
for all ￿"[￿; ￿ ￿]: Integrating on both sides of (B.3), using (B.1),
￿ ￿ Z
￿
(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))sji(￿)dF(￿) <




(^ pj ￿ cj(￿))^ xj(^ q;￿)dF(￿) = 0 (B.4)
The inequality in (B.4) is reversed when "ji(^ q;￿) decreases with ￿:
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